Inheritance System and Care: Queer will-writing

by Dr Antu Sorainen, Title of Docent, Academy of Finland Research Fellow, University of Helsinki, Gender Studies (antu.sorainen@helsinki.fi)

Laurie Anderson, in a recent interview with the Guardian, was asked: “What song would you like played at your funeral?”
Answer:
“Not my problem.” [1] [2]

Even though it is a witty remark, I beg to disagree. Arranging one’s after-life could be of a great benefit for those one cares about. Kinship, care and inheritance belong to the same package. The wealthy always knew this and took care of their economic interests through marriage and bloodline based inheritance arrangements. Not many of those at the margins of the society think that they need to write wills, seek to arrange their financial aftermaths, or indeed, funeral rituals to make sure that their kinship tradition lives. However, those few queer funerals that I have attended, carefully following the wishes of the deceased person, have been really important for the queer community, including at a symbolic and performative level, building and passing on the tradition, history, encouragement and memories of many important aspects of the past and present queer struggles.

In my view, we should actively advocate will-writing among those social groups who traditionally have not “owned” this tradition as theirs, especially under the current neoliberal and conservative political and economic currencies targeting the inheritance system that I will discuss in my next blog post. Activists in the legal field should encourage people to take care of their inheritance arrangements as far as they can, as an important and oft-neglected form of care; in particular, queer care. By this, I mean that inheritance could be conceptualised and re-imagined as not only transformation of property but also as taking care of those who actually matter in one’s life: directed towards friends, lovers, and community. Will-writing offers a pathway to new identifications: we could re-imagine new concepts for care practices that the society tries to hide from the people who do not follow its dominant norms.

Daniel Monk (2013) [3] argues that will-writing potentially offers a site for queer acts. He suggested that they as well as being the scene for an ultimate declaration of one’s final will, provide possibilities for not only to pass on property but also for passing of other kinds of “goods” such as coming-outs, supporting the queer community and/or the chosen family, friends or lovers, disinheriting the possibly homophobic blood relatives, or publicly recognising the “real” care and support relations in one’s life.

Will-writing is a reflection of an ideal of autonomity of the modern individual. If sexually or otherwise marginalised people would look at will-writing as their right to define the posthumous destiny of not only their wealth but also of the well-being of people who they really care for, also outside of the blood relatives circle, they might more often come to think to write wills for supporting their lovers, friends, community, and other real life-carers. In this way, as a mechanism for transmitting property from one person to another, and from one generation to another over time, lesbian and gay wills could have a considerable social and economic significance.

There is a particular purchase to bringing in legal thinking in the study on inheritance and socially marginalised groups since as a discipline and practice it has to deal with different kinds of relationships. The law is the classic locus for situations where categorical and interpersonal relations confront each other: the law deals with persons in relation to categories [4] . When it comes to inheritance, often even a small inheritance has made it possible for many ordinary as well as many famous people to create uncommon, radical, world-changing lives outside the pressure of the normative legal and social understanding of parenting and relationships (Sorainen 2015). [5]

Coming up  in my second blog post:
“I worry about putting my friends in a difficult economic position if I’ll add them into my will”, one of my lesbian interviewees told me. This is a legitimate concern because, in her country, Finland, her queer care and support network members would be subjected for a much higher inheritance tax than her emotionally distant siblings would be.

My next blog-post will consider how, in this way, legal categorizations privileging bloodline and/or marriage often fail to recognize the actualities of non-normative personal lives and the ”chosen heirs”. This is especially prudent as on 27 May 2015, Finland decided to seek to change its inheritance laws. At the moment, if a close blood relative or a friend inherits property in Finland, the inheritance tax is from 8- 36%. But in case of inter-generational family business inheritance, the tax is, on average, only 2,8% of the market value of the company. I discuss the effect of this on the queer community and on the dissemination of wealth throughout society.

References:

[1] http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2015/may/16/laurie-anderson-interview

[2] When I told the anecdote at the opening of this blog to one of my gay male interviewees, he said: “In my funeral, they should play Laurie Anderson’s song Same Time Tomorrow.” The song goes like this: “And so when they say things like “We’re gonna do this by the book”, you have to ask “What book?”, because it would make a big difference if it was Dostoyevsky or just, you know, Ivanhoe.” – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ePMwwa436ug

[3] Monk, Daniel. 2013. “EM Forster’s will: an overlooked posthumous publication.” Legal Studies, Volume 33, Issue 4 December 2013, 572–597.

[4] Strathern, Marilyn (2005). Kinship, law and the unexpected: Relatives are always a surprise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

[5] Sorainen, Antu. 2015. “Queer Personal Lives, Inheritance Perspectives, and Small Places.” Nordic Journal for Queer Studies – Lambda Nordica, a special volume on Kinship and Reproduction, 3-4/2015 vol. 19.

Care Paid and Unpaid: Social, Economic and Human Rights Concerns

by Dr Joan Garvanwww.maternalhealthandwellbeing.com

Attempts to achieve gender equity have reached a new high water mark and the recognition and redistribution of care, both paid and unpaid, stands at the centre of this arena. The Australian secretariat – Economic Security 4 Women – have produced landmark reports, both scoping and quantifying the value of the ‘care economy’ and, more recently, Professor Marilyn Waring addressed the topic of care and dignity in the annual Pamela Denoon Lecture Series. Here below are key points from these papers and central messages made by Waring.

Two significant Australian reports on the care economy have been produced over recent years: Scoping the Australian Care Economy A Gender Perspective (2010) and Counting on Care Work in Australia (2012). These projects are concerned with the lifelong economic well-being of women. Though they are particular to Australia and reference local government policies, programs and strategies, they draw from an international body of research and deal with common concerns.

The first report references the importance of data collection and brings attention to landmark work in the Massachusetts case study that used United States Census and Time Use data to measure both paid and unpaid care work [1]. The author Valerie Adams notes tensions between unpaid work, voluntary work and paid work. She draws attention to the ‘relational’ nature of care work, and references the concept of ‘provisioning’ for human need. The report used the notion of ‘care work’ to depict both the paid and unpaid sectors. Adams considers definitions and current issues in the Australian care economy. She surveys relevant government policy and makes numerous recommendations for further research and data collection.

Counting on Care Work in Australia (2012) further develops this arena by quantifying the value of the paid and unpaid care sectors to the Australian economy. In 2009-10 twenty per cent of all paid employment in Australia was in the care sector. Care workers receive 96 cents for every dollar earned by the average Australian worker, and female workers earn on average 84 cents in the dollar to male care workers. The report valued the unpaid care sector at $650 billion with sixty per cent of this contribution being made by women aged 25 to 64. The report furthermore outlined and quantified government investment in the care sector. The authors make recommendations for further work in light of: demographic change; inter-generational concerns; and the continuing economic and life course implications for women.

Marilyn Waring prefaced her recent lecture Care and Dignity: Major challenges to economics and human rights (transcript and video available online: http://pameladenoonlecture.net/) with the proposition that over millennia care has been the primary responsibility of women. She has changed her emphasis since the publication of Counting for Nothing: What men value and what women are worth (1988) [2] and now frames these concerns within a Human Rights perspective.

Waring raised problems for the use of ‘care’ as an analytical category, arguing that most often carers are responsible for a myriad of associated tasks that could be lost through a continuing association with unpaid work. Nevertheless, drawing from studies from British Colombia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and the United Kingdom, she sets out a strident case whereby the human rights of care givers are being flouted. She and others set up a questionnaire for a Commonwealth report drawing from Amartya Sen’s capability approach to human rights which references choice, rest, health, meals, work and political involvement, and found multiple breeches.

With governments around the world withdrawing from social and welfare programs these kind of arguments are critical if we aren’t going to ‘throw the baby out with the bathwater’. Care, both paid and unpaid, are clearly significant to the health and well-being of the community, but further to this gender equality will remain allusive if we don’t see transformational change. Unfortunately the issues are complex and though there is increasing reference to the work of unpaid care in terms of achieving gender equity, there is a need to bolster and popularize the debates.

References

[1] Albelda, R., Duffy, M., Folbre, N. (2009), Counting on Care Work: Human Infrastructure in Massachusetts, University of Massachusetts, MA, Massachusetts

[2] In a recent anthology, Counting on Marilyn Waring: New Advances in Feminist Economics, edited by Margunn Bjornholt and Ailsa McKay, 31 authors from nine countries outline the wide ranging impact and resonance of Professor Waring’s work as well as the current frontiers of feminist economics.

 

 

Peripheral Thinking and Abortion Care

By Ruth Fletcher

‘Peripheral thinking’ seems to me to be one useful framework for identifying what states do when they respond to residents’ practices of travelling away for care.   States take a variety of actions when their residents cross borders for care; actions which produce, stigmatise, ease, regulate and represent that flow all at the same time pulling it in different directions. If we want to understand better the effects of those actions and perhaps even how to steer them, we need a way to differentiate between them while acknowledging the transnational space they occupy. Here I want to distinguish between three different kinds of peripheral thinking that inform such state actions – inverted, tangential and circular – in order to consider further how best to respond to the spaces for engagement that they open up. My reflections work out from the example of state actions and transnational care flow with which I’m most familiar, that of Irish state practices as they contribute to women’s outward flow for abortion care (Fletcher, 2013).

Inverted peripheral thinking

When states adopt law and policy that support travel for care whose provision is restricted at home, one kind of peripheral thinking they use to justify their actions takes an inverted form. They claim that the failure to provide the particular care at issue is actually evidence of a central role in international care provision and not a peripheral role.   In arguing that Ireland is an international leader in care for the ‘unborn’ and in maternity care more generally, the state has often represented its failure to care for pregnant women as a success. This is a familiar if crude form of thinking, which Barrett (1992), drawing on Marx, called the ‘camera obscura’ version of ideology.   The periphery represents itself as central to the delivery of care (to the ‘unborn’), with the effect of negating a peripheral role and obscuring failures in care delivery (to pregnant women).

Tangential peripheral thinking

But inverted peripheral thinking is not the only rationality that states use when they play a role in generating outward flows for abortion care. They may turn authoritarian in restricting or punishing travel for abortion care (Fletcher, 1998), but that is relatively rare. It is more usual for states that are peripheral to the provision of abortion care to end up accommodating use of that care to some extent because their residents compel them to. In the 1990s the Irish state famously compromised on its anti-abortion position by constitutionally recognizing freedoms to travel to and receive information about abortion care abroad. Since then the Crisis Pregnancy Programme has developed a network of predominantly pro-choice counselling agencies throughout the Republic of Ireland which provide free pregnancy counselling and post abortion check ups.

In a two-tier health system where many people pay fees to attend a general practitioner, the provision of free pre- and post- abortion care, with all its limits, is significant. In using regulatory techniques such as public funding, training and communication to normalize travel for abortion care, the Irish state demonstrates tangential peripheral thinking. Here the peripheral thinker does not want to become core as care provider, but instead approaches the core provision of abortion care sideways.   Peripheral thinking develops tangential connections with the core provider of abortion care by taking on activities which are a key part of abortion care, but are themselves on the periphery of that care, namely the provision of information, counseling and check ups. Tangential peripheral thinking then is conscious of being at a distance from core care provision, and does not want to become core. Rather tangential thinking connects periphery and core care providers by taking peripheral care activities, which are needed for the provision of core care, as the object of its attention and facilitation.

So far, civil society critics of Irish abortion policy have focused on the discriminatory and hypocritical aspects of this kind of tangential thinking (e.g. ARC, CRR, DfC, ICCL, IFPA, WHRA). Travel policy has discriminatory effects and is not an adequate means of the state meeting its public responsibilities, because the less mobile will be less well served. Abortion travel policy is hypocritical because it cedes its domestic anti-abortion moral stance and supports access to abortion on grounds that would not be legal within the territory. But these critiques can retain their truth while we also recognize that travel policy has some positive effects from a feminist perspective.

We can welcome the way that this public recognition of women’s use of abortion care has likely contributed in some way to increased tolerance of abortion.   Opinion polls now regularly reveal greater levels of support for abortion than the state is willing to entertain in domestic provision. Although, as in many other countries (e.g. Sanger, 2014), Irish women are far from feeling free to speak openly at will about their abortion experiences, there have been several initiatives which tackle the association of abortion with stigma in the public sphere (Enright, 2014). The state’s tangential peripheral thinking has opened up (and indeed arguably resulted from) spaces for feminists and pro-choice advocates to engage and push the state further towards recognizing and serving women’s needs.

Circular peripheral thinking

A third kind of peripheral thinking that we see in Irish abortion travel policy takes a circular form and argues that there is nothing the state can do to change its own practices. Here the state argues that its own rules, or the views of the people, prevent it from acting to cure some harm or wrong that it cedes is in contravention of international human rights norms. There was a particularly spectacular example of this kind of peripheral thinking evident in the state’s response to the UNHRC during Ireland’s review under the ICCPR in July 2014. The Minister for Justice and her staff faced hard-hitting criticism by the HRC members for the failure to protect women’s civil and political rights in relation to abortion but also more generally (e.g. Cahill, 2014).

Representatives of the Department of Justice responded by relying on Article 25 and the right to vote to say that past abortion referendums meant it could not do any more legally to bring Irish abortion law into conformity with the Covenant. As Enright tweeted during the hearings (I’m paraphrasing), “to recap, the Department of Justice has just argued that Parliament can vote to inflict inhuman and degrading treatment on women”. Much was made at the time of this failure of the state to recognize that this ‘tyranny of the majority’ type argument contradicted the whole premises of the state’s claimed commitment to human rights, and indeed HRC member Mr Shany asked the state party to withdraw the relevant statement.

But here the point I want to make is that this way of thinking is a circular denial of sovereign power to make and interpret law. This state is so embedded in the periphery of abortion care that it can’t even imagine the possibility of proposing a referendum which would liberalise abortion provision, rather than restrict it (see further Flinterman’s comments). A state which refuses to act in legislating for abortion care (except when forced to by the ECtHR in ABC) on the grounds that its own legal rules so prevent, or that the people would not tolerate such action, has a strange understanding of its own legal power and moral responsibility.

In representing itself as a passive effect of its own legal authority, the state adopts a circular form of peripheral thinking which renders it eternally peripheral to its own power in a spectacular act of legal misrecognition. Of course, the state could introduce a Bill to remove Article 40 3 3. It could decriminalize abortion. It could promote an interpretation of Article 40 3 3 that recognizes substantive differences between pregnant women and fetuses, and permits domestic abortion in a way that would likely reduce the outward flow. But it chooses not to.

Conclusion

States, particularly the Irish state, have actually been quite creative in responding to their residents’ practices of travelling abroad for care that is restricted at home. They have used a range of regulatory techniques that have effects on cross border care flows. In the case of law and policy on abortion-related flows, these different techniques present challenges and resources to those of us who wish to make abortion access easier. First of all, we need to throw our net more widely when we try to capture legal tools that have an effect on women’s abortion practices. The legal instruments which restrict women’s access on the territory of the nation-state are significant. Inverted peripheral thinking, which denies harms to women while celebrating care of the ‘unborn’ as a marker of international leadership, arguably takes care and international norms seriously, but requires redirection.

But as women’s cross-border abortion practices illustrate, norms of domestic restriction are not the only legal instruments that are significant. Regulatory measures that promote non-judgmental information and counselling and provide public funding do acknowledge extra-territorial abortion use and attempt to reduce harms to travelling women. Working with such tangential peripheral thinking may provide further opportunities to destigmatise abortion and promote a harm reduction framework. And finally, the kind of circular peripheral thinking, which sees the state deny its own power to have an impact on care flows, provides welcome opportunities for reminding the state that women are not the only ones who bear public responsibilities for care provision.

PS I wrote this before the news of the recent abortion refusal case broke.  My initial thoughts on that failure in abortion care are here: http://humanrights.ie/constitution-of-ireland/contesting-cruel-treatment-ruth-fletcher/

If you would like more information about civil society’s campaigning responses to this case and more generally please see: http://www.abortionrightscampaign.ie and https://www.facebook.com/pages/Speaking-of-Imelda/571659212932533

Comments welcome.

‘Who is Helping Who?’ – Co-Production and Professional Boundaries within Social Care services.

By Nick Andrews

I have been working in education and social care for thirty years, and have seen various new initiatives and buzz words come and go, whilst the fundamental principles of humanity remain the same. ‘Co-production’ in its truest senses is grounded in these principles. However, as with the concepts of ‘personalisation’ and ‘reablement’, there is a real danger that the term  ‘co-production’ is misused for hegemonic purposes to cover up what is essentially a cost cutting exercise. Under this scenario, individuals and their communities are expected to take on more responsibility for their own well-being whilst the machine of impersonal and ‘professionalised’ public services carries on as it always has done, albeit it with a few less staff employed. In my opinion, this would be a travesty and missed opportunity to restore warm humanity as the driving force for public services, not compliance with increasingly centralised and de-personalised processes and systems.

One of my favourite quotes by the theologian Martin Buber is ‘all real living is meeting’. Please note that Buber’s understanding of the term ‘meeting’ is much richer than the idea of putting a group of people together in a room or placing nurses and social workers in the same office, which is commonly assumed to result in integrated practice. I am sure many people will share my experience of being in meetings where no one actually met, where each person had their own agenda and the purpose of the meeting was to get this across – to win the argument.  For Buber, ‘meeting’ is about genuinely connecting with other people and being changed in some way by the process. In order to explain this process, he talks about two ways of relating to people and the world, which he calls ‘I-It’ and ‘I-Thou’.

In ‘I-it’ relationships, the person is detached and unaffected. In ‘I-Thou’ relationships, the person is attached and vulnerable. Tom Kitwood, in his seminal book ‘Dementia Reconsidered – The Person Comes First’ talks about his experience of seeing how people living with dementia were dehumanised through receiving emotionally detached task based care:

‘A man or woman could be given the most accurate diagnosis, subjected to the most thorough assessment, provided with a highly detailed care plan and given a place in the most pleasant of surroundings – without any meeting of the I-Thou kind ever having taken place’ (Kitwood, 1997)

By contrast, I believe that genuine co-production facilitates and nurtures the development of ‘I-Thou’ relationships between all parties, which in so doing begins to challenge the prevailing understanding of professionalism and professional boundaries.  In relation to this, I am currently co-ordinating a NISCHR and Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) funded project in Wales, which is focused on the use of evidence from their ‘A Better Life – for older people with high support needs’ programme, along with other forms of evidence in social care service and workforce development.

The ‘A Better Life’ programme has identified that relationships are key and ‘Often it is the simple things that bring the most pleasure (and the lack of them can bring a sense of sadness and loss) and services do not always seem to be very good at delivering ‘the ordinary’’. (Blood, 2013 p13)

The research challenges also call for a different way of working, which is often alien to the world of emotionally detached and compliance focussed task based care, which is summed up nicely in the following quote by Edgar Cahn:

‘The world of helping others in need is now built around one-way transactions…. and with the best of intentions, one-way transactions often send two messages unintentionally. They say: “We have something you need – but you have nothing we need or want or value.”’  (Cahn, 2004).

In a series of recent focus groups and learning events involving older people, carers and frontline staff, I have been struck by how many people feel that current regulation and guidance is risk averse restrictive and at worst destructive of human relationships. For example, workforce regulation states ‘the inappropriate use of touch is not permissible’, rather than ‘the appropriate use of touch is fabulous and to be encouraged’. This is a particular issue for people living with dementia, who often have to express themselves and connect with others through feelings and emotions. Frontline staff talk have talked about feeling guilty when they do little kind things that are not written in the Care Plan or receiving small gifts of appreciation, older people have been ‘told off’ (in the name of health and safety) for pouring tea for others in day services, and carers have been made to feel that they no longer have a role when the person they love goes into a care home.

At the heart of co-production, is an understanding that everyone has something to contribute and that exchanging these contributions is enriching for everyone concerned.  I am reminded of the work of Jean Vanier, who established the L’Arche Communities in learning disability services. Vanier did not see his role as caring for people with learning difficulties, but rather sharing his life with them and being open to receive and learn from them as much as to offer them support.

I am reminded of one of my earliest experience of working in social care services. It was 1984 and I had started my first job as a residential support worker in a children’s home. I thought I was the ‘sorted one’ who was employed to help others. I worked hard to form good working relationships with staff and children in the home, but one boy, who had experienced a lot of hurt in his life, kept his emotional distance. As anyone who knows me well can tell you, I am not gifted in DIY or anything that involves fixing something mechanical. One day, I was trying to repair my bicycle (I did not drive at the time) and was getting nowhere fast. The boy walked past me and said ‘I’ve got a book about repairing bikes, do you want to borrow it?’. I am pleased to say that I took up his offer and our friendship took off from that day. He is now a happily married 43 years old who lives on the other side of the country, but we still keep in contact via Facebook and phone and offer each other support and encouragement whenever we can.

Jean Vanier once said, ‘I am struck by how sharing our weakness and difficulties is more nourishing to others than sharing our qualities and successes’. This is an important message for social care practitioners and agencies. We need to open our ears, our eyes and our hearts to the people we work with, which might involve sharing our vulnerabilities and concerns and allowing ourselves to be changed by genuinely ‘meeting’ with them in truly co-productive relationships.

 

References

Blood, I. A Better Life – Valuing Our Later Years, York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, available at: http://www.jrf.org.uk/publications/better-life-valuing-our-later-years

Cahn, E. (2004), No more throw away people – the co-production imperative, Washington, Essential Books

Considering Age Relations in Research on Care

Rachel Barken

Concerns abound regarding the social, political, economic, and individual changes necessary to care for a growing population of older adults experiencing physical and cognitive decline.  These concerns are evident in academic scholarship, with a large body of research advancing theory and practice on caregiving and receiving in later life. Despite this focus on older adults, however, the ways age relations frame experiences of care are not clearly articulated. The concept of age relations, which owes much to the work of Toni Calasanti (e.g. Calasanti, 2003, 2006), considers the structured social relations that frame interactions among members of different age groups. Age is relational because one’s membership in an age group is defined in relation to other age groups, and because membership in these groups forms the basis for access to, or exclusion from, various rights and privileges. Inequalities among age groups intersect with other power relations associated with gender, class, and race/ethnicity. In this blog post I outline three ways theorizing age relations might move forward perspectives on later life care.

First, theorizing age relations helps to understand how care for older adults is conceptualized differently than care for people in other age groups. Feminists have long recognized that patriarchal conditions diminish the value of caring for ‘dependents,’ including children, disabled people, and older adults. But the devaluation of care work depends on the social status of those who are being cared for (Calasanti, 2006). The theory of age relations, with its emphasis on relational inequalities between and among members of different age groups, helps to explain why some forms of care are more highly valued than others. Because youth is regarded as a transitional status with such positive attributes as “ ‘hope’ or ‘future,’ ” (Calasanti, 2003, 208), childcare is often considered a generative task. By contrast care needs in later life are typically associated with physical decline, impairment, and weakness. These conditions present a permanent change in status and exclusion from previous activities rather than a temporary sick role from which one will emerge. Thus, older adults needing care are often viewed as a burden. The prevalence of debates regarding ways to minimize the economic and social costs of eldercare and the low status and of paid and unpaid caregiving for older adults are indicative of the inequalities among age groups that tend to disadvantage older adults and those caring for them.

Second, theorizing age relations brings into view the structured contexts that shape experiences of care. Social relations are structural in the sense that they frame people’s life course experiences and relationships with others. Theorizing age relations reminds us that the problems associated with later life cannot be solely attributed to physiological aging processes or to individual decisions made throughout the life course; rather, they emerge in socio-structural contexts.  For example common understandings and responses to age are embedded in policies guiding the distribution of pension incomes and spending on health and social care. These policies have a very real impact on older adults’ experiences of giving and receiving care.

Third, theorizing age relations gives insight on the intersecting relations of advantage and disadvantage—including class, age, gender, and race/ethnicity— that frame caregiving and receiving. These relations do not completely determine people’s life chances, but they do frame the contexts in which individuals act and interact (McMullin, 2000). An important difference between age relations and other forms of inequality is that aging is a universal experience. All people who live long enough to grow old will experience the marginalization associated with later life in an ageist society (Calasanti, 2003). The extent of this marginalization varies, though, as it intersects with class, gender, and race/ethnicity relations occurring throughout the life course. A framework that accounts for intersecting relations of inequality helps to explain, for example, older adults’ differential access to care and involvement in caring relationships.

Theorizing age relations has much to contribute to critical understandings of later life care. Debates regarding the relative influence of structure and agency, however, point to the potential limits of age relations. This concept recognizes that individuals hold the capacity to exert agency in the context of structured social relations, but primarily emphasizes the structural conditions that disadvantage older adults. This focus on disadvantage might inadvertently contribute to older people’s powerlessness. To avoid this risk, age relations must be theorized from the standpoint of older adults’ everyday, lived experiences (King, 2006). Theorizing age relations in research on older adults’ experiences of giving and receiving care can shed light on a private setting in which relations of dependency, power, and control between and among members of different age groups are worked out.

References:

Calasanti, T. M. (2003). Theorizing age relations. In S. Biggs, A. Lowenstein & J. Hendricks (Eds.), The need for theory: Critical approaches to social gerontology (pp. 199-218). Amityville, NY: Baywood.

Calasanti, T.M. (2006). Gender and old age: Lessons from spousal care. In T. M. Calasanti, & K. F. Slevin (Eds.), Age matters: Realigning feminist thinking (pp. 269-294). New York: Routledge.

King, N. (2006). The lengthening list of oppressions: Age relations and the feminist study of inequality. Age matters: Realigning feminist thinking (pp. 47-74). New York: Routledge.

McMullin, J. A. (2000). Diversity and the state of sociological aging theory. The Gerontologist, 40(5), 517-530.

 

 

 

 

Rethinking Age in the Context of Care

Age- and stage-based assumptions are deeply embedded in care models and across care practices (Grenier, 2012). Whether care is used to refer broadly to a concept, institutional and organisational practices, or to denote relationships between families and older people, age and care are intricately intertwined. This entry focuses on care provision as a site from which to consider the intersections of age and care, and whether current models are in line with older people’s needs, and the new realities of ageing. Care is often linked with discourses of dependence, and paradoxically associated with potential in youth, and decline in age (see Irwin, 1995; Gullette, 2004). In late life, care tends to be delivered based on age eligibility. Yet, with age and what it ‘means to grow old’ an increasingly contested terrain, it is time to reconsider how age is enacted or sustained through care practices, and consider whether age-based models of care are suitable in the contemporary context.

 

A number of complexities exist when we begin to unpick age and the organisation of care. Formal care provision tends to be delivered through age-based segments of youth and old age. Few formal care services are life-long. Yet, the separation of the life course into age- and stage-based periods, age as an organising principle, and former notions of ageing as decline have been called into question (Featherstone and Hepworth, 1991; Hockey and James, 2003). At the level of personal experience, older people voice that ‘they are not old’ – that the age they are assigned contrasts with their experience and sense of self (see Kaufman, 1986; Bytheway, 2011). This has created a disjuncture where suggested models and expectations are concerned, as well as an alignment with new forms of ageing that emphasise success, health and well-being (see Katz, 2005). And while universal understandings of age are quickly being unravelled, undeniable needs for care amongst older people continue to exist. Older people may need care at various points across their life course as a result of disability or chronic illness, ‘frailty’ or end of life issues, and/or at particular marginalised locations (e.g., poverty, older homelessness). Yet, are such needs for care age-based?

 

We are at a crossroads where the age-based provision of care is concerned. Although reconfigurations of policy based on chronological age are underway (e.g., public pension), current examples focus on age adjustments, rather than on differing needs or alternate arrangements. Perhaps the retention of age is prudent considering the realities of ageism, reconfiguring age to reduce social expenditure, and the structured inequities in late life (see Gee and Gutman, 2000). However, the contemporary context calls for reflection at minimum. How do we catch up with emerging realities of aging and adjust the organisation of care accordingly? Should age be used to organise care services? If so, in what circumstances? If not, how can we assure that those in need are not further marginalised? Such questions represent a starting point from which to reconsider age-based models of care, question underlying assumptions, and reconfigure care practices so that they are more aligned with changing notions of age and contemporary care needs.

 

Amanda Grenier, PhD, Associate Professor, McMaster University

email: amanda.grenier@mcmaster.ca

twitter: @amanda__grenier

 

References:

Bytheway, B. (2011). Unmasking age: the significance of age for social research. Bristol: The Policy Press.

Featherstone, M., and Hepworth, M. (1991). ‘The mask of ageing and the postmodern lifecourse’ In M. Featherstone, M. Hepworth and A. Wernick (eds) Images of ageing, London: Routledge.

Gee, E. M., and Gutman, G. M. (2000). The overselling of population aging: apocalyptic demography, intergenerational challenges, and social policy, New York: Oxford University Press.

Grenier, A. (2012). Transitions and the lifecourse: challenging the constructions of ‘growing old‘. Bristol: Policy Press.

Gullette, M. M. (2004). Aged by culture, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hockey, J., and James, A. (2003). Social identities across the lifecourse, Houndmills: Palgrave MacMillan.

Irwin, S. (1995). Rights of passage: social change and the transition from youth to adulthood,  London and Bristol: UCL Press.

Katz, S. (2005). Cultural aging: life course, lifestyle, and senior worlds, Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press.

Kaufman, S. (1986). The ageless self: sources of meaning in late life, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

 

Revaluing Care Workshop 2: September 2013, University of Adelaide, Australia.

At the beginning of September 2013 our Revaluing Care network had its second workshop, following an earlier workshop at Keele University, UK, in September 2012. This second meeting over two days at the University of Adelaide, in South Australia was marked by its attention to analytical concerns that had been raised in the 2012 session. It was also marked by much convivial discussion over food and wine at the end of each day.

We met in a room with views of the city all around us and, fortunately, the sun shone almost all of the time. What I recall most clearly was the very high standard of the papers, the sense of an extraordinary level of conversation within a group which has now forged a strong identity. The degree of confluence of ideas, of substantive and strongly supportive debate was striking. It is rare to attend such an event and feel constantly engaged by an extremely stimulating exchange of views. The event was both inclusive and demanding in the very best sense.

The workshop looked at a wide variety of existing services around care and their impacts on social interconnection (such as services around HIV/AIDs, young people and dementia care), as well as a range of existing legal and policy frameworks. This international orientation informed extensive discussion around new ways of conceiving care (for instance, in relation to social activism, migration and cross-national mobilities). However, it also enabled us to consider where the term care begins to fall away, or seems insufficiently recognised or activated. Consequently there was a significant interchange over the two days concerning the analytical and practical boundaries of care (for example, in relation to sexualities, diverse families, the notion of the human, marginalised services and public institutions seemingly distant from care including parliaments and courts).

These deliberations led to a range of theoretical and terminological discussions around the continuing usefulness of the notion of care, around what it covers and its limits.

The success of the workshop was not only evident in the strengthening of the network as an active, participatory and supportive research community, but also obvious in the final discussions around building research teams, projects and publications across the world and across disciplinary constraints. We aim as a result to produce articles, books of collected works, and grant applications. Many of these aims are now in process. The group was also firmly of the view that further workshops would be very worthwhile and assist in the development of these aims. So, watch this space.

In sum, I can only say that I, for one, gained immensely from the workshop and now have an even stronger sense of the considerable research capabilities of the group. This is a group with much to gain from our continuing association! It is one of the few research clusters that I have been involved in which shows ongoing promise of generating important intellectual exchanges and innovative new work .

Professor Chris Beasley

Discipline of Politics & International Studies (POLIS)
School of Politics and History
 
Co-Director, The Fay Gale Centre for Research on Gender

Faith, religion, spirituality and care

Regrettably, I am still a reader of the Daily Mail online. Whilst often infuriating, it does occasionally have its good points. Recently, an article on a new book about ‘mind over body’ – ‘The cancer patient cured by a broken radiotherapy machine and the paralysed man who walked again after visiting Lourdes: New book shows incredible influence of the mind over the body’ reminded me of Louise Hay’s excellent ‘You Can Heal Your Life.’ Hay considers the psychological/emotional/spiritual meanings and connections of physical illness, and offers those dimensions as spaces to support healing. All of this, in turn, got me thinking about faith, religion and spirituality as sites of care practices, sources and resources of care, and, then, their relationship(s) with care ethics. I realised that we have not as yet tapped this seam in our critique of care, and so wanted to raise this as a topic, perhaps for further discussion/contributions. Here is a brief bibliography to help get us started:

Care to comment/ discuss?

 

A Darker Side to Care..?

It’s been great to read the diverse blogs on this site and the definite slant given by commentaries on issues of identity and sexuality to the challenge of revaluing care. Some time ago I attended a meeting with some of the other members of this network where we raised the question of what is ‘queer care’. And more specifically, how could we go about finding out how it was practised and what it meant to people? We were interested in the lived realities of care for LGBT people but also whether queer theory could offer a framework for making sense of this experience.
Of the still very limited research on care in the context of LGBT ageing there is every indication that helping relationships are organised rather differently to traditional binary notions of the care-giver and care-receiver. For instance, Ann Cronin and Andy King’s work suggests interdependence over dependence in lesbian and gay relationships.  Research with the trans community by Sally Hines also points to support clusters and collective ways of helping people rather than dyadic carer/caree encounters. While Margrit Shildrick and Janet Price’s joint work on intercorporeality and their notion of ‘two bodies becoming together…’ sheds a very different light on how we think about the body itself and its potential in helping situations. However, the closeness and intimacy signalled by these accounts stand in contrast to findings regarding care for older LGBT people of the more formal/paid variety.
Here, care is an uneasy term, and comes with baggage. This is why it has been all but bracketed off in critical disability studies, with the intention that this may lead to more novel ways of thinking about the helping relationships that evolve between people. Perhaps then a queer approach could also usefully begin by treating care with caution –  after all there’s no saying that ‘revaluing care’ might not lead us to decide it is a less useful term for future understandings of helping relationships rather than necessarily investing it with new worth. Many LGBT people’s experiences invite such a possibility because so much of what is badged as care can be experienced as very negative and damaging. This can range from the wholesale neglect of the individual supposed to be ‘in care’ to a diverse range of sometimes more subtle indicators of disapproval, disgust or rejection communicated verbally, behaviourally, emotionally, viscerally etc. and all of which are enfolded within care practices. To date, these experiences are not well documented, partly because LGBT people in the ‘Fourth Age’ are largely invisible and ignored by mainstream gerontology, as Ann Cronin has pointed out, and often are too concerned for their safety to identify themselves in the context of relying upon care services. Do the assumptions that underpin how we currently think and talk about care serve to perpetuate the cultural silence about this darker side?
Taken collectively, research to date tells us that many LGBT people are afraid of a time when they might require care. Findings in the UK and US have uncovered significant numbers who would rather take their life than be admitted to a care home and many more who report a fear of care that involves body work and the prospect of being exposed to and handled by a care worker (although much of this research has been conducted with fit and independent people being asked to anticipate the need for care rather than describe the experience of it). Ironically, older LGBT people are more likely to require formal care by virtue of being less likely to have children and more likely to live alone, but evidence suggests many delay or refuse altogether the uptake of services due to anticipation of negative treatment and its impact upon their lives. At the very least then, formal care has a serious reputation problem in certain quarters. But research with older LGBT people also suggests it has a dark side – one that is perhaps most visible from certain (queer) standpoints. In our efforts to debate and revalue care maybe we should begin with the perspectives of those who have a close-up on the under-side of care and its darker recesses. And perhaps the place to start in ‘queering’ care is to dispense with the term altogether in an effort to find alternative ways of capturing helping relationships and reconfiguring the terrain of help and support in later life in ways that might feel more acceptable to minoritised groups…?

‘Defining and exploring “care practices”‘ by Kathryn Almack

With my colleague Andrew King (University of Surrey), I’m starting work on a paper which aims to explore informal care practices within the lives of older lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) people. This will problematize the framing of ‘informal care’ within policy that most often assumes that these forms of care take place either within assumed heteronormative familial relationships and/or within a dyadic relationship, with one person the ‘carer’ and one the ‘cared for’. We are drawing on ‘case stories’ which we’ve developed from our research with older LGB respondents, selected to represent wider issues within LGB communities and illustrative of a range of care practices, including care provided by friends and strangers, reciprocal care and other expressions of care within LGB communities. We anticipate our paper will also contribute to wider debates about the increasingly diverse range of family forms and social relationships that are not easy to name or recognize.

In developing this paper, we are also searching for our theoretical framework within which to situate this; the thoughts on this below are my own, although it will be something that I work on in collaboration and further feedback from members of the networks are welcome.

I’m leaning towards defining and exploring ‘care practices’ –  akin to Morgan’s (1999, 2011) concept of family practices – as a way to investigate and interrogate care and caring relationship and practices and in particular, unpack the meanings of such practices – emotional, relational, moral, and symbolic. The concept of family practices seeks to shifts the focus towards what families do rather than a focus on family structures; but nevertheless also recognising that at everyday levels the ‘family’ is still a term used by individuals to describe their most meaningful relationships. Morgan suggests that this perspective offers the possibility to see the family as ‘less of a noun and more of an adjective or, possibly, a verb’ (1999:16).

Care practices could encompass a whole range of practices that bind people together, that may include conflicts, tensions and ambivalence as well as affection and love. Thus addressing some of the complexities of care – interdependence, reciprocity, conflicts (workings of power/imbalance), resources, identities, moral deliberations, emotions, labour, working across time and space, involving networks as well as individuals and dyadic relationships.

There are of course other ways of theorising care, including carescapes and an ethics of care framework. Carescapes (Mckie et al 2002) seeks to add a dimension to thinking about care across time and space – the concept developed out of concerns focused on the changing yet gendered nature of caring for children and time-space relations implicit in combining caring and working and shifting roles as children grow (but that may have wider application to other relationships of care):

Mapping routes through the shifting and changing multi-dimensional terrain that comprises their vision of caring possibilities and obligations: routes that are influenced by everyday scheduling and by combining caring work through paid work and the paid work of carers (McKie et al 2002: 904)

And of course, an ethics of care framework has been developed and drawn upon to theorise values of care (key references include Tronto, 1993 and more recently Barnes, 2012) – involving both thought and action and placing value on notions of responsibilities of providing good care; valuing connectedness, incorporating values of dignity and respect. It seems to suggest and encompass a moral framework – though not prescriptive – about the delivery of care and how it is delivered. Is that distinct from or similar to the meanings ascribed to relationships through the doing of care?

I’m left with questions that I don’t yet have answers to. Are there overlaps between the three – care practices, carescapes and ethics of care? Is it that they have developed within different spheres and that they do say the same things in different ways or do they offer distinct contributions to debates on care?  All thoughts and ideas most welcome in taking these reflections forward.

 

Name, address, contact details.

Dr Kathryn Almack

Senior Research Fellow

B Floor, QMC

School of Health Sciences

University of Nottingham

Nottingham

NG7 2HA

 

Tel: +44 (0)115 8231204

Email: k.almack@nottingham.ac.uk

 

References:

Barnes, M. (2012) Care in Everyday Life: an ethic of care in practice. Bristol: Policy Press

McKie, L., Gregory, S. and Bowlby, S. (2002) Shadow Times: The temporal and spatial frameworks and experiences of caring and working. Sociology, 36,4:  897-924

Morgan, D. H. J. (1999) “Risk and family practices ” in Silva, Elisabeth B. and Smart, Carol (Eds.) The New Family? London: Sage Publications, pp. 13-30

Morgan, D. H.J. (2011) Rethinking Family Practices. London: Palgrave Macmillan

Tronto, J. (1993) Moral Boundaries: a political argument for an ethic of care. London: Routledge